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Sovereignty Over Unoccupied Territories
-The Western Sahara Decision
INTRODUCTION
IN RESPONSE TO DEMANDS for the decolonization of
Spanish Sahara, the United Nations General Assembly voted
on December 13, 1974, to request the International Court of Jus-
tice to render an advisory opinion on the key issues involved in
the decolonization dispute. The Resolution asked the Court to de-
cide:
I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet el Hamra),
at the time of colonization by Spain, a territory belonging
to no one (terra nullius)?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative;
II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the
Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?t
The issues presented to the Court by this Resolution involve
the acquisition and maintenance of legal title by a sovereign over
remote and sparsely inhabited territory. This problem had been
adjudicated by various international tribunals,2 and consequent-
ly, the Court had a body of relevant case law on which'to base its
decision. Even so, the Court apparently retreated from the guide-
lines established in these earlier decisions by finding that Western
Sahara was not terra "nullius and that neither Morocco nor, Mauri-
tania had sufficient ties to the territory to establish sovereign
title.
BACKGROUND
Western Sahara is a vast, phosphate-rich desert, with a pre-
dominately nomadic population of 76,000 people. 3  Spain's claim
to Spanish Sahara originated in 1509, but from 1524 to 1860, the
area was under Moroccan control. In 1884, Spain proclaimed
a protectorate over portions of Western Sahara. By 1958, Spain
IG.A. Res. 3292, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 103, 104, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974). See also Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12.
2 See Palmas Island Arbitration, (Netherlands-United .States), 2 R.. Int'l
Arb. Awards 829 (1928); Clipperton Island Arbitration (France-Mexico), 2
R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1107 (1931); Legal Status of Eastern" Greenland Case,
(Norway-Denmark), [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, 1;' Minquiers" and
Ecrehos Case, (United Kingdom-France), [1953].I.C.J. 47.
3 TIME, Jan. 26, 1976, at 34.
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had extended its occupation to the rest of the territory, and it be-
came a province of Spain. 4
The end of the Spanish rule began in 1970 with the adoption
by the United Nations General Assembly of Resolution 2711,5 a
decree guaranteeing the right of the peoples of Western Sahara
to self-determination. In that Resolution, the General Assembly
called upon Spain to create a conciliatory atmosphere conducive to
a referendum which would allow the population of Western Sa-
hara to "exercise their right to self-determination and to freedom
of choice .... "6 This declaration led to a December 1974 re-
quest for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Jus-
tice on certain problems relating to the decolonization of West-
ern Sahara.7 The Court rendered a decision8 on October 16,
1975, and almost immediately King Hassan of Morocco, citing
ancient claims to the territory, declared that he would send
350,000 unarmed Moroccans into Western Sahara to claim the ter-
ritory for Morocco. 9 His march began on November 6, 1975, and
proceeded some six miles into Western Sahara territory to a point
just opposite a Spanish minefield.io On November 9th, King
Hassan bowed to international pressure and ordered a with-
drawal from the territory.1 An agreement was negotiated be-
tween Spain and Morocco in which Spain agreed to abandon West-
ern Sahara on February 2, 1976.12 An interim arrangement
calling for joint administration of the territory and a referendum
to be organized by the two provisional powers was announced. 3
The Spanish government received significant concessions in the
form of oil, gas, and fishing rights in the territory, in return for
the agreement establishing Morocco and Mauritania as joint ad-
ministrators.1 4 Presently, the territory is under control of this pro-
visional government, and the prospects for a referendum are small.
4 25 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 3 6 0 y (int'l ed. 1971).
5 G.A. Res. 2711, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 100, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
6 Id. at 101.
7 G.A. Res. 3292, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 103, 104, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
8 The Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, [1975] I.C.J. 14.
9 N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
10 N.Y. Times, Nov. 8,' 1975, at 13, col. 5.
11 N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
12 N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
13 N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
14 N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1975, at 4, col. 4.
[Vol. 9:135
SAHARA DECISION
Algeria, the only country actively pressing for a referendum, is
currently supporting a revolutionary army in Western Sahara.15
In response to this threat, Morocco attempted to support its an-
nexation efforts by holding its own referendum among the tribal
chiefs of the area. 16 The chiefs were reported to have overwhelm-
ingly supported continued Moroccan control.17
I. THE Terra Nullius ISSUE IN THE WESTERN SAHARA OPINION
A. Application of Intertemporal Law.
Before finding that Western Sahara was not terra nullius, the
Court had to determine a critical date from which to measure the
claims of the parties. In many cases, the rights of the parties de-
rive from legally significant acts, or a treaty concluded very long
ago. To ensure fairness to the parties, these rights must be evalu-
ated in light of the law contemporary with them, not with refer-
ence to the law in force at the time that the dispute arose. 18 Thus,
the designation of Western Sahara as terra nullius must be deter-
mined by the rules of international law in force at the time Spain
colonized the territory. The critical date established by the Court
for this purpose was 1884 - this corresponding to a Spanish proc-
lamation establishing a protectorate over the southern portion of
Western Sahara (Rio de Oro).19
According to the law in force at the time of the Spanish col-
onization, land which was terra nullius could consist of:
(1) Uninhabited lands, unless they are suitable for permanent
habitation and are being used for the purposes for which
they are suitable;
(2) lands inhabited by individuals who are not permanently
united for political action;
(3) lands which have been abandoned by their former occu-
pants; or,
(4) lands which have been forfeited because they have not been
occupied effectively.20
Occupation was the means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty
over terra nullius territory. Consequently, the Court reasoned that
15 N.Y. Times, May 6, 1976, at 5, col. 1.
16 N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1976, at 6, col. 2.
17 Id.
18 Palmas Island Arbitration, supra note 2, at 829.
19 [1975] I.C.J. 38.
20 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 396 (1940).
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a determination that Western Sahara was a terra nullius at the time
of Spanish colonization would be possible only if it were estab-
lished that, at that time, the territory belonged to no one in the
sense that it was open to acquisition through the legal process of
"occupation."21 The Court concluded that because Western
Sahara was not terra nullius, there was no issue as to whether
Spain had effectively occupied the territory. This conclusion
rested on state practice at the time of the colonization - that ter-
ritories inhabited by peoples having a social and political organiza-
tion were not regarded as terra nullius.22 Sovereignty, in these
cases, was said to derive from agreements with local rulers and
not through a unilateral occupation of the terra nullius.22
a
There are two issues presented by the Court's terra nullius
opinion. First, was the test of effective occupation employed by
the Court one that was generally recognized at the time of Spanish
colonization of Western Sahara? Second, had the tribes of the
area reached the level of political sophistication attributed to them
by the Court?
The Court's conclusion that territory occupied by tribes having
a social and political organization is not terra nullius has support.
A notable commentator in the area indicates that there had been
a preponderance of juristic opinion in favor of the proposition
that lands in the possession of any backward peoples who were
politically organized ought not to be regarded as terra nullius.23
This view, while supported by a majority of 19th century legal
scholars, is not conclusive however. Another doctrine which de-
nied that international law recognized any rights in primitive
peoples to the territory they inhabit also had a respectable follow-
ing.24  In its most advanced form, this latter approach demands
that such peoples shall have progressed so far in civilization as to
be recognized as members of the "Family of Nations" before they
can be granted such rights.25 Other writers maintain that a ter-
ritory is terra nullius as long as the occupying peoples lack an "in-
ternational personality."'26 While there would appear to be some
21 [1975] I.C.J. 39.
22 Id.
22a 10 INT'L LAWYER 201 (1976).
23 M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1926).
24 Id.
25Id.
2 1 G. SCHWARZENBiRGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (1949).
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disagreement as to the validity of the standard used by the Court,
the Court's test seems to reflect the opinion of a majority of the
writers on the subject. One is forced to rely solely on these opin-
ions because there are no judicial decisions dealing with the occu-
pation of lands inhabited by natives organized on a tribal level.
All of the cases in the area 27 deal with the conflicting claims of
two countries to an area which has been effectively occupied by
at least one of them. Under these circumstances, a strict terra
nullius issue would not arise except insofar as one of the parties'
title was based on occupation. The courts have preferred to de-
cide these terra nullius cases on alternate grounds and have fav-
ored placing title in one claimant even though there are grounds
for a finding that the territory is terra nullius.28 Thus, in the
Eastern Greenland case, 29 Danish activity in the disputed area had
been minimal, but the court refused to declare the area terra nul-
lius.
Assuming that the Court employed the proper test of occupa-
tion, it remains to be seen whether it correctly applied it to the
facts of the Western Sahara case. In holding that Western Sahara
was not terra nullius, the Court relied on two assumptions:
(1) That at the time of colonization, Western Sahara was in-
habited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and
politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent
to represent them; and,
(2) That Spain did not proceed upon the basis that it was es-
tablishing sovereignty over terra nullius, but rather was tak-
ing the Rio de Oro under its protecti6n on the basis of
agreements entered into with the chiefs of local tribes.3 0
While the Court concludes that the tribes of Western Sahara
were politically and socially organized, it offers little in the way of
legal reasoning to support its conclusion. Had the question been
moot, this would have been understandable; but there appears to
be considerable ambiguity as to when a tribe has reached a suf-
ficient level of political sophistication to be declared sovereign
over the territory it inhabits. The distinction between civilized
and uncivilized, or between political and non-political, is not one
that can be drawn with the apparent ease assumed by the Court.
27 See note 2 supra.
28 I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (2nd ed.
1973).
- [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, 1.
- [1975] I.C.J. 39.
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The traditional test employed in this situation poses three re-
quirements for a society to be termed "political." They are: (1)
that the bulk of its members must be in the habit of obedience to
a certain and common superior; (2) that the society must possess
some degree of permanence; and (3) that the society must be
'considerable," that is to say, it must be composed of a number of
families.31 It would follow that, if a tract of land were inhabited
by isolated individuals, or even groups of individuals, who were
not united for political action, such a tract would be terra nullius.
This seems to, at least, raise a question as to the level of organiza-
tion among the inhabitants of Western Sahara.
The lifestyle of the inhabitants at the time of colonization was
almost exclusively nomadic, the environment being inhospitable to
any other form of existence.31  It appears that these tribes
recognized no common superior, nor did they engage in any but
the most rudimentary forms of concerted political activity. They
clearly did not believe that they exercised any right of control
over the land they traversed, nor did they, as a group, possess the
power to exclude other people from their land. While these peo-
ples were organized at the tribal level, it is not entirely clear that
this standing alone is enough to render the land occupied (that is,
non-terra nullius).32 Were not some degree of intertribal organi-
zation required, it would be difficult to imagine any populated
area which could be classified terra nullius. The lack of a support-
ing rationale in this part of the opinion may be regarded as a seri-
ous defect, especially given the fact that the area of law on which
the Court relies is not clearly articulated.
A second problem with this part of the decision lies in the
Court's failure to carry its reasoning through to a logical conclu-
sion. Had the Court done so it would have realized that by char-
acterizing Western Sahara as non-terra nullius, it was by defi-
nition declaring that the area was effectively controlled by a
sovereign. 33  This follows from the definition of terra nullius
adopted by the Court, that is, a territory belonging to no one. 4 If
a territory is not terra nullius, the result is that some politically orga-
nized group must be exercising traditional acts of sovereignty in
relation to it. If those traditional acts include, as the court in the
31 LINDLEY, supra note 23, at 20.
30a [1975] I.C.J. 41.
32 LINDLEY, supra note 23, at 20.
33 BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 130.
34 [1975] I.C.J. 39.
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Island of Palmas case indicates, 35 the right to exclude the activities
of other States, as well as the ability to protect the rights of
other nationals in the territory, then the Western Sahara Court
would be hard-pressed to name the party displaying these acts of
sovereignty in Western Sahara. In addition to the two qualifica-
tions previously mentioned, the Court in the Island of Palmas case
defines sovereignty in such a way as to disqualify all of the parties
with an interest in Western Sahara. It says that:
Sovereignty, which in relation to territory may be called ter-
ritorial sovereignty, in relation between states signifies inde-
pendence. Independence in relation to territory is the right to
exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the func-
tions of the state . . . territorial sovereignty belongs always
to one state, or in exceptional circumstances to several states,
to the exclusion of all others. 36
Indeed, Morocco and Mauritania are disqualified because of the
Court's determination later in the opinion that they lacked suf-
ficient ties of territorial soverignty to Western Sahara. 37  The
burden similarly cannot be placed on the tribes of Western Sahara
simply because they were incapable of exercising the acts of sov-
ereignty required by the Palmas decision over the vast majority of
the territory. Thus, the Court's conclusion that Western Sahara
was not terra nullius in 1884 is not consistent with the fact that
there was no country or group of individuals in a position to occupy
the territory at that time.
In support of its finding, the Court also seems to rely heavily
on the notion that the tribes inhabiting Western Sahara were
led by chiefs capable of representing them.38 While this may in
part relate to the Court's finding that these tribes entered into
valid treaties of cession with the Spanish government, it is in the
last analysis inconclusive. To state that these tribes had chiefs
competent to represent them is to state a tautology. All tribes
have leaders; a distinction exists only, using the Court's analysis,
if the leaders are not competent to represent their tribe. But
it is a fact that these chiefs were, with few exceptions, incapable
of representing their tribes in dealings with European powers seek-
ing to negotiate treaties of cession. In most cases, the native
chief did not even realize what he was transferring under the
35 Palmas Island Arbitration, supra note 2, at 839.
36 Id. at 838.
37 [1975] I.C.J. 68.
38 Id. at 39.
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treaty. 39  This lack of capable leadership, coupled with the es-
sentially nomadic character of their constituents, makes one
doubt that the tribes were the cohesive and politically organized
entities that the Court said they were. This damages the Court's
determination that the territory was not terra nullius, a determina-
tion based in part on the assumption that the tribes were viable po-
litical entities.
Finally, it should be noted that the Court does not go far in
explaining what definition it attached to the word "inhabited."
It uses the word in its holding that Western Sahara was not terra
nullius because it was "inhabited" by people who were politically
and socially organized. The Court does not recognize that there
might be an issue as to whether the majority of the tribes actually
"inhabit" Western Sahara. This issue is raised by the fact that
the migration routes of the tribes were not limited to Western
Sahara but tended also to cross into Mauritania and Morocco.
The sparsity of resources and the spasmodic nature of the rainfall
compelled all of the tribes to traverse very wide areas of desert.
Consequently, none of the nomadic routes were confined to
Western Sahara; some passed through Southern Morocco, a part
of present-day Mauritania or Algeria, and some through more dis-
tant countries. 40 Thus, a majority of the tribes were only tempo-
rary inhabitants of Western Sahara.
The Court, in its holding on this first issue, also notes that in
colonizing Western Sahara, Spain did not proceed on the basis that
it was establishing sovereignty over terra nullius.41 Rather, the King
of Spain took Rio de Oro under his protection on the basis of
agreements he had entered into with chiefs of the local tribes.
While this act alone is not conclusive, it does correspond to the
general practice of the time.4 2  Prior to the middle of the 19th
century, the European powers preferred to use the concept of
terra nullius when they acquired sovereignty over large areas of
Asia and Africa which were often in fact the seat of organized
communities. 43  Since then, they have tended to employ treaties
of cession rather than occupation as a means of establishing
dominion over backward peoples." While it has been noted that
39 LINDLEY, supra note 23, at 44.
40 [1975] I.C.J. 41.
41 Id.
42 LINDLEY, supra note 23, at 34.
43 BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 131.
44 LINDLEY, supra note 23, at 43.
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the tribes generally did not realize what was being transferred
under these treaties, the fact that the form employed was cession
indicates that the power concerned did not consider the territory to
be terra nullius. This is fairly conclusive, especially when one
considers that the colonial power was free to choose among a
number of acquisitive methods when dealing with these unde-
veloped societies.45  The fact that Spain chose not to treat the
territory as terra nullius is the Court's strongest argument on this
issue.
II. THE "LEGAL TIES" ISSUE IN THE WESTERN SAHARA OPINION
A. The Western Sahara Opinion
Once it was established that Western Sahara was not terra
nullius at the time of the Spanish colonization, the Court had to
determine whether Morocco or Mauritania had sufficient "legal
ties" to establish a valid claim of sovereignty over the area.
Generally, sovereignty over territory is expressed in terms
of a "continuous and peaceful display," 46 or an "effective display"
of state authority,47 rather than in terms of "legal ties." Con-
sequently, unlike the term terra nullius, "legal ties" did not have a
previously determined meaning in international law. Conse-
quently, to ascertain that meaning, the Court had to look to the
context in which the General Assembly's questions were pre-
sented. 48 The Court characterized legal ties as:
.. . referring to such "legal ties" as may affect the policy to be
followed in the decolonization of Western Sahara. In this con-
nection, the Court cannot accept the view that the legal ties
the General Assembly had in mind in framing Question 11 were
limited to ties established directly with the territory and without
reference to the people who may be found in it. Such an inter-
pretation would unduly restrict the scope of the question, since
legal ties are normally established in relation to people.49
Although the Court incorporated the General Assembly's
"legal ties" language into its holding, ° it did not discuss the
45 Generally, the other colonial powers would not challenge an acquisition
by another power of territory to which they had no claim. Id. at 45.
46 Palmas Island Arbitration, supra note 2, at 857.
47 [1975] I.C.J. 43.
48 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 363 (1976).
49 (1975] I.C.J. 40.
so In its holding, the Court recognized rights, including some rights relating
to the land, which constituted legal ties between the two countries and Western
1977]
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relationship between "legal ties" and decolonization in the rest of
the opinion. In fact, the Court employed a traditional defini-
tion of sovereignty in evaluating Moroccan and Mauritanian claims
to Western Sahara.sl
Morocco's claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara was
based on an "alleged immemorial possession of the territory,"
which possession, it maintained, was based not on an isolated act
of occupation but on the public display of sovereignty, uninter-
rupted and uncontested, for centuries.5 2  Morocco effnphasized
that on the basis of unique religious and cultural ties, it had
historically considered the area to be an integral part of its own
national territory. Evidence demonstrating the existence of ter-
ritorial continuity and contiguity between the two regions was also
relied upon to some degree .3 Morocco also invoked alleged
acts of internal display of Moroccan authority,54 as well as certain
international acts said to constitute recognition by other States of
its sovereignty over the whole or part of the territory.55 Moroc-
co's claims of sovereignty, in a word, were based not on tradi-
tional notions of territory but on bonds of religion and loyalty
Sahara. They also concluded that the information presented did not establish
any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and
the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus, the Court did not
find "legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XIX) in the decolonization of Western Sahara,
and in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and
genuine expression of the will of the people of the territory." Id. at 68.
51 Id. at 42.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 The principle evidence of this "internal display of authority" consisted
of acts alleged to show the allegiance of the Western Saharan sheikhs to the
Moroccan Sultan. These included documents concerning the appointment of
these sheikhs, the alleged imposition of Koranic and other taxes, and what
were referred to as military decisions, said to constitute acts of resistance to
foreign penetration of the territory. Morocco also placed emphasis on the two
visits of Sultan Hassan I to the northern portion of Western Sahara in 1882
and 1886 undertaken to strengthen his authority there, and on the dispatch of
arms by the Sultan to tribes inhabiting the territory to reinforce their resistance
to foreign penetration. Id. at 45.
55 The international acts relied on by Morocco included:
(1) certain treaties concluded with Spain, the United States, and Great
Britain between 1767 and 1861 which dealt with the safety of persons
shipwrecked on the coast of Wad Noun or its vicinity; and,
(2) certain bilateral treaties whereby Great Britain, Spain, France and
Germany were said to have recognized that Moroccan sovereignty
extended as far south as Cape Bojador or the boundary of the Rio de
Oro. Id. at 49.
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existing between the Sultan and certain tribes in Western Sa-
hara.56
The Mauritanian "legal ties" argument differed necessarily
from that of Morocco because, at the time of colonization, there
was no Mauritanian state in existence.5 7 Consequently, Maurita-
nia had to base its claims on ties between an amorphous
Mauritanian "entity" and Western Sahara.58 In statements
before the United Nations. General Assembly, the Mauritanian
representative argued that Western Sahara was inhabited solely
by Mauritanian tribes differing in no way from other tribes
inhabiting the northwestern part of Mauritania. To support this
contention he noted that these tribes had everything in common,
including; Hassania, a Mauritanian-Arabic dialect, culture, race,
and customs. Furthermore, he noted that the daily activities and
nomadic nature of the Saharan inhabitants were no different
from those of tribes living in Mauritania. 9 He also empha-
sized that the migration routes of these tribes were contained
wholly within the Shinguitti country, and that these routes com-
monly bisected or even trisected the artificial borders imposed
by the colonial powers.60  The existence of this community,
according to Mauritania, became especially apparent when its
independence was threatened, as evidenced by the concerted
effort 'made by the tribes throughout the Shinguitti country to
resist French penetration. 61
56 Id. at 44.
57 Id. at 57.
58 Geographically, the entity covered a vast region lying between the
meridian of Timbuktu on the east and the Atlantic on the west. The entity is
bounded on the south by the Senegal River and on the north by the Wad Sakiet
el Hamra. Ethnographically, it denoted the cultural and social entity within
which the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was to be created. According to
Mauritania, that entity, at the relevant period, was the Bilad Shinguitti, which
human unit was characterized by a common language, way of life, religion and
system of laws. The Bilad featured two types of political authority; emirates
and tribal groups. While recognizing that these emirates and tribes did not
constitute a State, Mauritania suggested that the concepts of "nation" and of
"people" would be more appropriate to describe the position of the Shinguitti
people at the time of colonization. According to Mauritania, the territory
presently under Spanish administration and the territory controlled by the
Islamic Republic of Mauritania, together constituted indivisible parts of a
single entity which shared valid legal ties with one another. [1975] l.C.J. 57.
9 29 U.N. GAOR 188, 199, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR. 2117 (1974). See also
2 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 293 (1976).
6 [1975] I.CJ. 59.
61 Id.
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B. The Court's Analysis of These Claims
By basing its claim to Western Sahara on "immemorial
possession" and an "uninterrupted display of authority," Morocco
was asserting that it had gained title through the process of
prescription. Mauritania's claim, while not strictly classifiable
according to traditional modes of territorial acquisition, 62 would
seem to be based on some immemorial ties to the area.
Like occupation, prescription is based on effective control over
territory. The difference lies in the fact that prescription is the
acquisition of territory which belonged to another state, whereas
occupation is acquisition of terra nullius.63 The requirements for
acquisitive prescription are similar to those necessary for effective
occupation in that both require the peaceful, continuous, and un-
interrupted exercise of the authority of a sovereign over the area.64
The exercise of the authority, apparently, must also be public, be-
cause the acquiescence of the former titleholder is necessary.65
The effective control necessary to establish title by prescription
must last for a longer period of time than the effective control
which is necessary in cases of occupation. This period may be a
"very long time," 66 or for "so long a period that the position has
become part of the established international order."6 7  The length
62 These modes are occupation, prescription, cession, conquest, and accre-
tion. Occupation is the acquisition of terra nullius, i.e. territory which, im-
mediately before acquisition belonged to no state. Prescription, like occupa-
tion, is based on effective control over territory. The difference is that
prescription is the acquisition of territory which belonged to another State.
Cession is the transfer of title, usually by treaty, from one State to another.
Conquest involves one State forcefully taking land from another State. Ac-
cretion is the means by which a state gains title to lands through the operation
of nature. The most common examples of this form of acquisition are the
formation of silt deposits in rivers or the emergence of volcanic islands. See
M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 183-87 (1971),
and 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1030-1224 (1963).
63 WHITEMAN, supra note 62, at 1066.
64 Id. at 1062.
65 Such acquiescence is implied in cases where the interested and affected
states have failed within a reasonable time to refer the matter to the appropriate
international organization or international tribunal, or - especially in cases
where no such action was possible - have failed to manifest their opposition
in a sufficiently positive manner through the instrument of diplomatic pro-
tests. Id. At least one author feels that this acquiescence of the former sov-
ereign is the operative factor in the acquisition of title by prescription. R.
JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1963).
66 L. OREFIELD, INTERNATIONAL LAW 353 (1965).
67 Lauterpacht notes that the length of time "... is such a period as is
necessary to create under the influence of historical development the general
[Vol. 9:135
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of time of continued occupation will vary in every case, and is
invariably a matter of fact to be decided by the international
tribunal before which the matter is eventually brought for adjudi-
cation. 68
Immemorial possession, the claim of title relied on by Mauri-
tania, is one form of acquisitive prescription. "Uninterrupted pos-
session" is singled out by some writers as another form.69 "In
the case of immemorial possession, the origin of an existing state
of affairs is uncertain, and since it is impossible to prove whether
the origin of this state of affairs is legal or illegal, it is presumed
to be legal."70 Like any form of prescription, it derives its justifi-
cation from the difficulties which grew with the passing of time,
with the necessity of furnishing evidence of matters far in the
past, and from the tendency not to change a state of affairs
which actually exists and has existed for a long time. 71 Thus,
when the origin of a State's possession of territory is unclear or
unknown, but it appears to have been continuous and uninter-
rupted, the territory will likely be awarded to the State on the
basis of immemorial possession.
The Court's rejection of Mauritania's claims of sovereignty
was based on its conclusion that the Bilad Shinguitti did not
constitute a recognizable "entity" capable of gaining sovereignty
over Western Sahara.72 The Court relied on The Reparation for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations73 case in de-
termining that the Mauritanian entity did not possess a personality
distinct from its composite emirates. That case dealt with the
issue of whether the United Nations had the capacity to bring an
international claim against the responsible de jure or de facto
government, with a view to obtaining reparations for injuries
suffered by United Nations personnel.74 The Court concluded
conviction that the present condition of things is in conformity with international
order." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 576 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht
1955).
68 WHITEMAN, supra note 62, at 1062.
69 id.
70 Id.
71 Schwarzenberger, Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge, 51 AM. J. INT'L
L. 322 (1957). Whiteman (supra note 62, at 1080) describes the concept more
pragmatically as "possession which has lasted so long a time that it is impossible
to furnish proof of a different situation and which no person can remember hav-
ing heard spoke of."
72 [1975] I.C.J. 63.
73 [1949] I.C.J. 8.
74 Id. at 184.
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that the organization could bring these claims because it possessed
an "international personality." The United Nations was said to
possess such a personality because it was in "such a position, as
to possess, in regard to its members, rights which it was entitled
to ask them to respect. '" This "international personality" is
indispensable if an emirate or tribal group is to be granted an
"entity" status.76  The Court in the Western Sahara case con-
cluded that while the criterion was applied in a somewhat special
context in the Reparation case, nevertheless, it expressed the
essential test that must be satisfied where a group, whether com-
posed of States, of tribes, or of individuals, claims to be a legal
entity distinct from its members. 7v The Bilad Shinguitti did not
satisfy this test because its constituent tribes were completely
independent of one another and shared no common institutions
or organs even remotely similar in character. 7
By basing its rejection of Mauritania's claims on this test of
entity status, the Court was able to dismiss any Mauritanian
argument based on cultural ties between the Bilad Shinguitti
and the tribes of Western Sahara. Of initial benefit was the
Court's being able to avoid having to decide the merits of the
actual ties of sovereignty between Bilad Shinguitti and the tribes
of Western Sahara. This question would have proved difficult
because most of the tribes inhabiting the southern portion of
Western Sahara were members of the Bilad Shinguitti. This
allegiance to the Bilad would have constituted a legal tie had
not the Shinguitti entity itself been found not to exist. At the
same time, however, the Court relied exclusively on a test which
was vague and difficult to apply. Why the Bilad Shinguitti was
unable to assert the rights, with regard to its member tribes,
''which it was entitled to ask them to respect" is not at all clear.
The Court did, however, reach the correct conclusion and based it
on the fact that the constituent tribes shared no common institu-
tions.
The Court, it would appear, had other grounds at its disposal
to deal with the Mauritanian claims. Mauritania's proof of ties of
allegiance between the Western Saharan tribes and those com-
posing the Mauritanian "entity" was weak and unsubstantiated.
The evidence tended to show that far from merging into or disap-
75 Id. at 178.
76 Id.




pearing within the framework of the so-called Mauritanian entity,
the tribes of Western Sahara led lives independent of the other Sa-
haran tribes.79  Especially prominent among this evidence were
treaties of cession concluded between the tribes of Western
Sahara and several European states.1°  The Court noted that
this evidence illustrated the lack of allegiance shown by these
independent tribes to the Mauritanian entity.
While the territorial ties invoked by Mauritania were weak,
those displayed by Morocco were comparatively stronger. Con-
sequently, the Court's discussion of the latter's ties was more in-
volved, and for the most part, not as well supported by the
precedents relied on by the Court.
With respect to Morocco's claims, the issue before the Court
was whether, at the relevant time (1884), Moroccan sovereignty
was effectively exercised or displayed in Western Sahara. For
purposes of this discussion the critical words in the Court's eyes
were "effective control." If Morocco could prove sufficient legal
ties to establish a claim of effective occupation, the Court would
have no choice but to recognize it. In an effort to establish a
claim of effective occupation Morocco pointed to certain acts of
internal display of Moroccan authority and to various interna-
tional acts said to constitute recognition by other States of its
sovereignty over the whole or part of Western Sahara.s1 Morocco
invoked, inter alia, the decision of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case82
to support its claim of effective occupation. Morocco stressed
that during a long period it was the only independent state in
northwestern Africa.83 It also pointed to geographical con-
tiguity and the character of the land as factors to be considered in
evaluating Morocco's claim to Western Sahara.8 In this way, the
Moroccan government hoped to bring its case within the holding
of the Court in the Eastern Greenland case.8s
The term "effective occupation" has been developed in major
part through the International Court of Justice's decisions in the
79 Id. at 61.
80 Id. at 62.
81 Id. at 45.
82 Supra note 2.
83 [1975] I.C.J. 42.
4 Id.
Is Supra note 2.
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Palmas Islands6 and Eastern Greenlandl7 cases. In the Palmas arbi-
tration, the dispute centered on conflicting claims of sovereignty
over the Island of Palmas, an isolated island halfway between the
Philippines and the most northerly island in the Dutch East Indies.
The United States title was derived from Spain by way of ces-
sion under the Treaty of Paris. The Spanish claim, in turn, had
been based on the titles of discovery, recognition by treaty, and
geographical contiguity. The Netherlands, on the other hand,
founded their claim to sovereignty on the title of peaceful and
continuous display of authority over the island. The arbitrator
held that the Netherlands title was proved by evidence of a con-
tinuous and peaceful display of sovereignty for a long period of
time and was superior to the title asserted by the United States. 88
In the Eastern Greenland case,8 9 the Court was called upon
to decide between the conflicting claims of Norway and Denmark
to the eastern coast of Greenland. Denmark claimed that the
sovereignty it exercised over Greenland had existed for a long
time and had been continuously and peacefully displayed, and,
until the present dispute, had not been contested by any other
State. It also contended that Norway was estopped from denying
Danish sovereignty over the island because Norway had recog-
nized various treaties establishing Danish sovereignty.90 Norway
contended that Denmark exercised no sovereignty over the area
which Norway occupied on July 10, 1931, and that at the time
of the occupation, the area was terra nullius. It claimed that the
area lay outside the limits of the Danish colonies in Greenland
and that Danish sovereignty extended no further than the limits
of these colonies.91 Norway also claimed that attempts made by
Denmark to obtain recognition of her position in Greenland were
inconsistent with a claim to be already in possession of the dis-
puted area, and that she was therefore estopped from alleging a
long-established sovereignty over the whole island.92
The Court, in holding for Denmark, did not use the test de-
veloped in the Palmas case but referred to a title derived from a
16 Id.
97 Id.
88 Palmas Island Arbitration, supra note 2, at 869.
9 Supra note 2.





"continued display of authority. '" 93  This title involves two
elements, each of which must be shown to exist: The intention
and will to act as sovereign and some actual exercise or display
of such authority. 94 The first element seems to require no more
than positive evidence that the particular State intends to establish
sovereignty over the disputed area. This evidence may consist
either of published assertions of title or of specific acts of sov-
ereignty. 9  It is the requirement imposed by the second element,
that sovereignty must be sufficiently manifested, which requires
analysis.
The Island of Palmas, Eastern Greenland, and Clipperton Island%
cases are the leading authorities on effective occupation. These
cases developed four requisites of effective occupation. These are
that the display of sovereignty must be; (a) peaceful, (b) con-
tinuous, (c) actual, and (d) sufficient to confer valid title. The
validity of Morocco's claims under each of these requirements
will be considered.
In order for the exercise of sovereignty to be peaceful, it
seems that no more is required than that the assertion of sov-
erignty is not contested by another State. 97 In addition, the Court
in the Eastern Greenland case held specifically that mere protests
from Norway did not alter the peaceful character of Denmark's
display of sovereignty. 98 Morocco's claims would appear to satis-
fy the requirements of this broad test. There is no evidence that
the control exercised by the Moroccan government over the
Western Saharan tribes was contested in any way by any other
States.
13 Id. at 45.
94 Id.
95 WHITEMAN, supra note 62, at 1031.
6 In the Clipperton Island case, the dispute centered on a small atoll
located several hundred miles off the coast of Mexico. French claims of sov-
ereignty over the island were based on conspicuously minimal acts of effec-
tive occupation. These included a proclamation of sovereignty over the island,
and an unsuccessful attempt by a French vessel to land there, and a protest to the
United States following the discovery of a group of Americans collecting guano
on the island. The Mexican case rested on an allegation of Spanish title through
discovery which title was later inherited by Mexico. The arbitrator decided that
even if a historic right existed, it was not maintained by any act of Mexican
sovereignty. He concluded that the island was terra nullius and that the French
acts were sufficient to gain sovereignty over the island, even in the absence of
any efforts to occupy it. 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1107 (1931).
97 WHITEMAN, supra note 62, at 1032.
98 [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, 62.
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The requirement that the display of sovereignty be continuous
is also fairly broad in its application. Displays of sovereignty at
irregular and comparatively long intervals were held sufficient for
effective occupation both in the Island of Palmas and Eastern Green-
land cases. The Clipperton Island case may perhaps also be re-
garded as a correct though extreme example of the principle.
Thus, in the Island of Palmas case, the arbitrator noted that the
degree of continuity varies widely according to circumstances.
Therefore,
Although continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot be ex-
ercised in fact at every moment on every point of a territory. The
intermittence and discontinuity compatible with the mainte-
nance of the right necessarily differ accordingly, as inhabited
or uninhabited regions are involved . . .99
Consequently, the fact that Western Sahara is essentially unin-
habited and susceptible only to very limited forms of human ac-
tivity inevitably diminishes the level of continuity required.
Under this liberal test of continuity, Morocco would appear to
have exercised some form of more or less continuous activity in
relation to Western Sahara. Whether or not this activity was
sufficient to establish sufficient ties of sovereignty is the critical
question.
The requirement that the display of sovereignty be actual
means only that the claim be exercised in some way and not exist
as a mere paper claim dressed up as an act of sovereignty. 1°°
There is generally no dispute as to whether the occupying State's
acts are actual, as this requirement is satisfied by very little
in the way of activity. The difficulty comes in determining
whether these acts are sufficient to confer valid title. The es-
sential consideration becomes whether the occupying State's ac-
tivity was continuous and peaceful, to use the language of the
Palmas Court, or was based on a continued display of authority,
using the language of the Court in the Greenland case. The level
of effective possession may be such as to show that the claimant
really acted as an international sovereign would have acted under
the circumstances. 101  Understandably, a great deal of latitude is
given when determining what acts are considered crucial to 'this
analysis. Basically, any act of authority will suffice, although a
premium is placed on acts going to the control of the area in
99 Jessup, The Palmas Island Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 877 (1928).
100 WHITEMAN, supra note 62, at 1032.
101 Id. at 1033.
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dispute. Thus, the religious and cultural ties relied on by both
claimants would be treated as ties of international sovereignty,
as would the political ties of allegiance to the Sultan which
Morocco claimed existed. While these represent factors to be
considered, the courts, including the one reviewing the Western
Sahara dispute, have tended to require more concrete evidence
of effective occupation. The courts have tended to look for
evidence of effective occupation as manifested by the establish-
ment of a proper state machinery for purposes of defense and
administration of the occupied territory. 02  Some writers have
maintained that effective occupation takes place, in ordinary cases,
only when the State establishes an organization in the territory
capable of making its laws respected. 10 3  They do, however,
allow a considerable exception in the case of remote or unin-
habitable lands1 °4  The Court in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case 05
placed emphasis on the claimant's capability to defend the occupied
territory. It noted that the exercise of effective military control
did not necessarily require the garrisoning of practically unin-
habitable places, but rather consisted of the power to hold such
areas at will and to prevent other States from occupying them.106
The evidence supplied the Court by Morocco gives no indication
that Morocco had either the intention or the ability, prior to 1884,
102 Id. at 1036.
103 A. McNAIR AND H. LAUTERPACHT, ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 104 (1927-28).
104 In those exceptional cases the occupation is considered effective from
the first moment that the occupying state makes its appearance in the area.
A. McNAIR AND H. LAUTERPACHT, ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 107 (1931-32). Brownlie (supra note 28, at 151), a writer with similar views
on the subject, notes that in these cases "little is required in the. nature of state
activity, so that a first and decisive act of sovereignty will suffice to create a
valid title."
105 This case involved a dispute between France and England over the
disposition of certain islands in the Channel Island group. Both sides relied on
a title as ancient as their title to their mainland territories so the issue cen-
tered on which of the two countries had. more effectively occupied the islands.
The United Kingdom stressed the reality and the effectiveness of their pos-
session over a long period, a possession which they said should be compared
with that of Denmark in the Eastern Greenland case and that of the Netherlands
in the Island of Palmas case. The principal French claim was that' title to the
islands was originally vested in France and that it had done nothing -to abandon
its claim. The court held' that by virtue of England's defense and adminis-
tration of the islands, it was deemed to have effectively occupied them. Acts
of occupation such as the imposition of property and customs taxes, the es-
tablishment of criminal proceedings and boat registries were examined by the
Court. [1953) 1.C.J. 47.
i6 id. at 78.
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to defend Western Sahara. There is some evidence that the
Sultan supplied arms to a few tribes in Rio de Oro to reinforce
their resistance to foreign penetration, 107 but this would be insuffi-
cient to establish Moroccan defense of the territory. It is also
illustrative to note that Morocco's claims of sovereignty over the
territory did not rest on the historical defense of Western Sahara.
While this did not considerably weaken Morocco's case, the
fact that Morocco also excluded all but the most basic references to
any administration of the territory may have been crucial. By at-
tempting to bring itself within the holding of the Eastern Greenland
case, Morocco committed itself to providing evidence of its as-
suming some role in the administration of the territory. The
Court in the Eastern Greenland case placed great weight on the
fact that a systematic "extension of sovereignty by means of
the extension of colonization and administration was consistently
followed by Denmark"' '0 8 These instances of Danish adminis-
tration and legislation in reference to Greenland were varied,
and also controlling in the Court's mind.109  This process of
administrative extension culminated in the Decree of May 10,
1921, which declared that the whole country was henceforward
attached to the Danish colonies and to Danish administration of
Greenland.110  The Court in the Island of Palmas case placed similar
weight on this requirement of administration. In describing the
nature of the parties' ties to the island, the Court noted that:
[L]t is an island permanently inhabited, occupied by a
population sufficiently numerous for it to be impossible that
acts of administration could be lacking for very long periods
... .The inability in such a case to indicate any acts of public
administration makes it difficult to imagine the actual display
of sovereignty, even if sovereignty be regarded as confined
107 [1975] 1.C.J. 33.
10 [1933] P.C.I.J., set. A/B, No. 53, 110.
109 Evidence of Danish administration of Greenland exists from as early as
the eighteenth century. The founding of the Danish colonies in Greenland
was accompanied by the grant of a trade monopoly by the Danish legislature.
These ordinances. regulated trade with the Danish colonies on Greenland and
prohibited the maltreatment of native Greenlanders. Furthermore, the trading
regulations applied not only in the existing colonies but also in any future
colonies which might be established. Subsequent acts of administration, in-
cluding the activities of government-supp6rted hunting expeditions, increases
:in the number of government authorized scientific expeditions, the granting
of trading and mining concessions and the issuing of permits by Danish authori-





within such narrow limits as would be supposed for a small
island inhabited exclusively by natives."'
Morocco, for its part, was able to invoke few examples of
direct administration of even part of Western Sahara (supra, note
49). The imposition of Koranic taxes, the so-called "military
decisions" said to constitute acts of Moroccan resistance to foreign
penetration of the territory, and the acts of administration result-
ing from the allegiance of certain tribes to the Sultan are the
only bona fide acts of administration presented by Morocco." 2
The Court found that it did not have to rule on the sufficiency of
these acts because the evidence indicated that these administra-
tive efforts were directed to areas situated within present-day
Morocco. 113 Furthermore, the Court found that the information
furnished by Morocco could not be said to provide convincing
evidence of the levying of Moroccan taxes with respect to the
territory. 1 4
The Court's finding that these taxes were not imposed, and
that claimed acts of Moroccan sovereignty did not even reach
into Western Sahara can hardly be challenged. The Court was
justified in dismissing these claims without determining whether
they did in fact constitute valid ties of sovereignty. Still, the
method used by the Court to dismiss the remaining Moroccan
claims, that is, those that could not be summarily dismissed as
not extending all the way into Western Sahara, was suspect.
Included among the acts of Moroccan sovereignty that extended
into the territory were agreements signed between the Sultan
and tribes inhabiting Western Sahara relating to the recovery of
shipwrecked seamen, documents of allegiance to the Sultan, and
letters from the Sultan to several of the tribes requesting the per-
formance of certain acts entirely within the borders of Western
Sahara." 5  The Court makes its greatest leap of faith by noting
that these acts showed that the Sultan exercised some administra-
tive authority in Western Sahara, but that they did not establish
any tie of territorial sovereignty. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court dismissed out of hand the primary Moroccan contentions.
11Supra note 2, at 855.
112 [1975] I.C.J. 45.
113 Id. at 48.
114 The Court seemed to rely on the fact that there was no evidence of the
Western Saharan tribes paying taxes, and that there was no possibility that
such evidence could be adduced. Id. at 46.
115 Id. at 48.
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In doing this, the Court divided the Moroccan acts into two
groups - those that did not extend into Western Sahara and those
that did. The Court then devoted a lengthy discussion to the
former, the easier group to deal with from a substantive viewpoint,
and a mere paragraph to the latter.116
A second defect exists with respect to the Court's disposition
of the Moroccan claims. It has already been noted that the
arbitrator in the Island of Palmas and Eastern Greenland cases
recognized that in thinly populated and uninhabited areas very
little in the way of actual exercise of sovereign rights might be
sufficient to establish sovereignty in the absence of any competi-
tive claims."' The Court held in the Eastern Greenland case that, as
there had been no claim of sovereignty by any other power, and in
view of the inaccessible character of the country, mere acts of
legislation were sufficient evidence of the effectiveness of occupa-
tion." 8 Even less exacting was the award of the arbitrator in the
Clipperton Island case; 119 a case often referred to as an example
of a situation in which international law dispenses altogether
with the requirement of effectiveness of occupation. 2° In effect,
the case held that the degree of effective occupation which is re-
quired is such occupation as is appropriate and possible under the
circumstances.12 1 Thus, the mere symbolic notice of occupation
was held sufficient even though the French government made
no effort -to occupy the island.122 One addition must be made
to these principles in light of the modern cases, most notably, the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case1 23 That is, when uninhabited or very
sparsely inhabited territory is occupied, the occupying State may
not necessarily be required to maintain even a single official perma-
nently on the spot.. It is enough if the State displays the functions
of the State in a manner corresponding to the nature of the terri-
tory, assumes the responsibility to exercise some local administra-
tion,.and does so in fact when occasion demands.124
116 Id.
117 [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 45, 46.
118 WHITEMAN, supra note 62, at 1042.
1 Supra note 96.
120 See note 96 supra for a description of the acts held to be sufficient for
effective occupation of the island. See also WHITEMAN, supra note 62, at 1042
(1963).
121 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 132 (1933).
122 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932).
123 [1953] I.C.J. 47. See also note 105 supra.
12A WHITEMAN, supra note 62, at 1033.
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In the Western Sahara opinion, the Court took judicial notice
of the statements in the Eastern Greenland case that very little
in the way of actual exercise of sovereign rights was necessary
in the thinly populated areas to reduce them to effective occupa-
tion. 125  The Court, however, found this principle inapplicable
due to the "paucity of evidence of actual display of authority
unambiguously relating to Western Sahara."' 126 The Court also
noted that Western Sahara, if somewhat sparsely populated, was
a territory across which socially and politically organized tribes
were in constant movement and where violent incidents between
these tribes were frequent.127 But had the Court reasoned more
carefully, it would have realized that it is not possible to distinguish
between the political and social organization of Greenland's
Eskimos and the Western Sahara's nomadic tribes. Thus, the
Court's statement that the Moroccan claims "were not on all
fours with those of Denmark in the Eastern Greenland case"128
appears to be an oversimplification, at least with respect to the
type of tribes inhabiting each region. In addition to misinterpret-
ing the Eastern Greenland case, the Court severely limited the
scope of the Clipperton Island case. 129  The test of effectiveness
of occupation established in that case was very broad and was
at least arguably satisfied by Morocco in this case. 13°  It ap-
pears, then, that in denying the claims of Morocco, and possibly,
Mauritania, the Court retrenched from its earlier opinions by in-
creasing the evidentiary requirements for the effectiveness of
occupation.
Despite the inconsistencies in the Court's use of precedent,
there are several factors which justifiably militate against the
Moroccan claims. In the first place, the French government's
acts in the Clipperton Island case can be easily distinguished from
those of Morocco. In that case, the arbitrator attached great
importance to the "regularity of the act by which France made
known in a clear and precise manner her intention to consider the
Island her territory."' 3 1  Morocco, on. the other hand, did not
1 [1975] I.C.J. 43.
127 Id.
128 Id.
121 Supra note 96.
130 The case essentially held that the occupation required differs by the
facts of each case, and in some cases, no real occupation was required. See
notes 120, 122 supra.
131 McNAIR AND LAUTERPACHT, supra note 104, at 107.
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notify any other party of its intention to exercise sovereignty over
Western Sahara. While such notification is not necessary to
establish territorial sovereignty over an area, 132 the intention to
occupy is. 133  There is no evidence that Morocco ever com-
municated its intention to establish sovereignty over Western
Sahara prior to 1884, nor were any direct references to this inten-
tion contained within the Moroccan government papers or other
historical sources. The lack of evidence of Moroccan administra-
tion of Western Sahara 34 also appears to go a long way to negate
this intention.
In attempting to bring itself within the decision of the Court
in the Eastern Greenland case, Morocco also relied on arguments
based on historical rights to, and geographical proximity with,
Western Sahara. The Mauritanian government also relied heavily
on historical claims to the territory. These historical claims of
sovereignty have generally not been upheld by the courts. 135
The Court in the Eastern Greenland case noted that historic claims
to dominion over whole regions - claims which had, formerly,
played an important part in the allocation of territorial sovereignty
- lost weight and were gradually abandoned even by the States
which had relied upon them. International law began to require
a close connection between the existence of sovereignty and the
effective exercise thereof.136 In the Clipperton Island case, Mex-
ico's claim of sovereignty was based on historic rights unsupported
by any other acts of effective occupation. Predictably, these
rights were declared void by the arbitrator. 137  Following these
principles, the Western Sahara Court was justified in rejecting
both claims based on historical title.
The Court was also justified in rejecting Morocco's claim
of sovereignty based on geographical contiguity. The Court, in
discarding this claim, noted: "The geographical unity of Western
Sahara with Morocco is somewhat debatable, which also militates
132 This principle was established in the Island of Palmas case where the
Court said that "an obligation for the Netherlands to notify to other powers
the establishment of suzerainty over the Sangi States or of sovereignty in these
territories did not exist." 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 868 (1928).
133 The intention or will to act as sovereign is one of the two elements of
the Eastern Greenland test. [1975] I.C.J. 43.
134 Supra note 104.
135 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 854, 869 (1928).
136 3 M. HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 202 (1938).
137 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1109 (1931); see also 26 AM. INT'L L. 393
(1932).
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against giving effect to the concept of contiguity. '"138 Instead of
relying solely on this argument, the Court should have noted that
the arbitrator in the Island of Palmas case said quite flatly that "the
title of contiguity, understood as a basis of territorial sovereignty,
has no foundation in international law."139 This statement does
not stand alone. It is almost universally agreed that "geographi-
cal contiguity is no more than evidence raising some sort of pre-
sumption of effective occupation; a presumption that can be re-
butted by better evidence of sovereignty by a rival claimant."140
MARK A. SMITH, JR.*
t[19751 I.C.J. 43.
131 Supra note 2, at 869.
140 JENNINGS, supra note 65, at 75.
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